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TORTS-THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-ABSOLUTE
LIABILITY, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION,
SONIC BooMs. Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972).
J IM NELMS, a resident of a rural community near Nashville, North
Carolina, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina, under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
Mr. Nelms claimed that his house was damaged beyond repair by a sonic
boom caused by military planes on a training mission. The District Court
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment 2 on the ground
that the training mission was embraced by the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial holding that the discretion-
ary function exception could not be used as a defense by the Government,
4
and that Nelms could proceed on the theory of absolute liability.
5
Relying on its decision in Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States,6 the
Fourth Circuit held the discretionary function exception cannot serve as
a valid defense when Government employees are under a duty imposed by
law to perform a mandatory act. The Court of Appeals in Nelms construed
an Air Force Regulation 7 as restricting the discretion of the Commander-
in-Chief who authorized the training program, as well as his subordinates.
Although the court considered the decision to fly at supersonic speeds
discretionary, the degree of protection to be given civilians within the
reach of the sonic boom was not.8
128 U.S.C. H 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FTCA].
2 Laird v. Nelms, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 92 S. CL 1899, 1900 (1972).
3 See 28 U.S.C. I 2680(a) (1970). The FTCA shall not apply to "Any claim based
upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government ... or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused."
4 Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163, 1165 (4th Cir. 1971).
5Id. at 1168.
6 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951). The discretionary function exception was held
inapplicable by reason of the Wreck Removal Acts placing a mandatory duty upon
the United States to mark or remove wrecks. 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1970); 33 U.S.C.
H1 409, 414 (1970).
7U.S. Air Force Reg., No. 55-34 (1960), providing in part for maximum protection
to be afforded civilian communities and for the Air Force to "accept responsibility
for restitution and payment of just claims." (Emphasis added.)
6442 F.2d at 1166.
f105]
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Having determined that the Government's defense could not be
asserted, the plaintiff had only to show the damage to his property was
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of a Government
employee "under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 9 Being unable to prove
negligence, the plaintiff relied on the doctrine of strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities. 10 The Government asserted as controlling
Dalehite v. United States," where the Supreme Court held that the FTCA
did not extend to cases of absolute liability.12 Responding to the Govern-
ment's contention, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the position it took in
United States v. Praylou,"3 decided shortly after Dalehite.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed, 14 holding that the
FTCA precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negligence
or other form of "misfeasance or nonfeasance" 15 on the part of the
Government, regardless of state law characterization.
The Supreme Court relied on Dalehite v. United States, 6 a case which
arose out of the Texas City disaster of 1947. In Dalehite, the Federal
Government loaded ships with ammonium nitrate fertilizer which
exploded and resulted in about 300 separate personal and property claims.
After the Dalehite court concluded that the alleged negligence did not
subject the Government to liability 17 they dealt with the contention that
the Government was strictly liable because of the ultrahazardous activity
in which they were engaged. 18 The four-man majority concluded that the
FTCA was to be invoked only on a "negligent or wrongful act or
omission" of an employee. The court construed the phrase "negligent
or wrongful act or omission" to preclude recovery based on the theory of
absolute liability, because the tortfeasor may be held liable, under this
theory, regardless of how he conducts himself.19
928 U.S.C. 11346(b) (1970).
10 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
11346 U.S. 15 (1953).
12 Id. at 45. ".... the Act does require some brand of misfeasance or nonfeasance, and
so could not extend to liability without fault."
13208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954). The Government
was held strictly liable under State law. The basis of liability was a statute imposing
absolute liability on private persons engaged in ultrahazardous activities which resulted
in damage.
14 Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972).
1 Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, 45.
16 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
'7 Id. at 42.
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Nelms, concluded
that the "necessary consequence" of Dalehite is that the United States has
consented to be sued only where there has been a "negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government," and thus a "uniform
federal limitation" exists under the FTCA.20 (Emphasis added.) The
court concluded that the decision in Dalehite was controlling by reason of
stare decisis and by Congress' indifference to the decision.
21 Once the
court determined that absolute liability could not serve as a basis of
recovery under the FTCA the court found it unnecessary to examine
the scope of the discretionary function exception.
22
The dissent considered the majority's conclusion not justified by the
language, history, or purpose of the FTCA.
2 3 They felt the doctrine of
absolute liability should be applicable if the conduct of Government
employees would be actionable under the law of the State where the
conduct occurred. 24 It would appear that once this determination has been
made it would then become necessary to examine the scope of the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA to determine if the act falls
within the class of those where the Government has not waived its
immunity. Despite this fact, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that once it is
determined that the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable to sonic
booms, the discretionary function exception is irrelevant and the court
need only consider questions of causation and damages.
2 5
There are three reasons why the majority opinion in Nelms is
questionable. First, it has been suggested that the portion of the Dalehite
decision which dealt with the doctrine of absolute liability was dicta, and
that the case was decided entirely on the discretionary function exception.
21
Second, whether or not this theory is correct, later Supreme Court opin-
ions interpreting the FTCA have limited Dalehite.
27 Rayonier v. United
20 92 S. Ct. at 1900.
21 Id. at 1903.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1906; see 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1970), "...if a private person would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."
25 92 S. Ct. at 1907.
26 Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 Fm. BJ. 139
(1964).
27 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The court held the
Government was not immune from liability on the basis that private persons do not
perform similar functions. It is significant to note that the majority in Indian Towing
were the dissenters in Dalehite and vice versa. Accord, Rayonier Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315 (1957).
3
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States is of particular significance because of a footnote contained therein 2
which cited Praylou, the principal case relied on by the Fourth Circuit in
Nelms. Praylou was cited as one of four cases, all standing for the
proposition that if there was anything contrary in the Dalehite decision it
was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing Co. v. United States.29 Thus, the
four cases were cited to show that the Dalehite decision had been limited.
The footnote in Rayonier had been generally understood to mean that
the rejection of absolute liability in Dalehite had been "implicitly
abandoned." 30 It was thought that the Government would be subject to
absolute liability under those statutes which would subject a private person
to similar liability.3 ' It is difficult to comprehend how the majority in
Nelms could claim that one of the bases of their decision was stare
decisis and not even mention the Rayonier decision.
The third factor weakening the majority opinion is the legislative
history of the FTCA as interpreted by Dalehite and reiterated by the
majority in Nelms. The legislative history relied upon by the majority
deals only with the discretionary function exception, an area which
the majority refused to consider.32
The major issue which must be examined, to properly analyze the
legislative history of the FTCA, is what the legislature meant by the phrase
"negligent or wrongful act or omission." Perhaps, the most effective way
to interpret this phrase is to specifically analyze its development. A tort
claims bill passed the Senate in 1942 which only provided for liability for
"negligence." 3 3 This bill was amended by the House Judiciary Committees4
and the phrase "negligent or wrongful act or omission" was used. The
committee indicated that, "the committee prefers its language as it would
afford relief for certain acts or omissions which may be wrongful but not
necessarily negligent. '3 5 Although this bill did not become law, the same
phrase was used in the bill enacted in 1946.
Persuasive arguments can be set forth to support the contention that
28352 U.S. 315, 319 n.2 (1957). "To the extent that there was anything to the
contrary in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing."
29350 U.S. 61 (1955).
30 92 S. Ct. at 1905.
31 Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 STAN. L. REv. 433, 435
(1957). This interpretation appears perfectly consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1970). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970), providing that the United States shall
be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances," would also serve to reinforce this belief, especially after
Indian Towing.
32 92 S. Ct. at 1903.
33 S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1942).
34 H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942).
P Id. at 11.
[Vol. 6:1
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the word "wrongful" was intended to include absolute liability, rather than
the narrow interpretation given to the phrase in Dalehite. As the dissent
in Nelns indicated, the doctrine of absolute liability was well established
at the time the FTCA was enacted and there is nothing appearing in the
history of the Act to indicate that this basis of liability was to be excluded.
36
As Judge Parker emphasized in Praylou, the phrase "negligent or wrongful
act or omission" could be equated with the word "tortious.
' ' 37 To support
his conclusion, Judge Parker relied upon the Restatement of Torts:
The word "tortious," therefore, is appropriate to describe not only an
act which is intended to cause an invasion of interest legally protected
against intentional invasion or conduct which is negligent as creating
an unreasonable risk of invasion of such an interest, but also conduct
which is carried on at the risk that the actor shall be subject to
liability for harm caused thereby, although no such harm is intended
and the harm cannot be prevented by any precautions or care which
it is practicable to require.
38
Absolute liability is both tortious and wrongful and thus should subject
the Government to liability, barring any legislative exceptions. (Emphasis
added.)
It is a well established principle of tort law that a statute may
prescribe a standard of conduct required of a reasonable man from which
it is deemed negligent to deviate.39 Often, absolute liability is imposed
upon one who violates these statutes, but under the name of negligence
per se. A strong argument has been made, based upon these statutes, that
it is a fiction to distinguish between liability for engaging in an
extra-hazardous activity and liability for negligence.
40
It has been determined that the FTCA is to be liberally construed, not
only because it is remedial legislation, but also to lessen the burden on
Congress to deal with special legislation. The Supreme Court has also
decided that there is no justification for exemptions to be read into the
FTCA beyond those provided by Congress.4' It should logically follow
that the theory of absolute liability should not be rejected as a basis of
recovery until Congress decides to specifically exempt it.
If the majority in Nelms was willing to accept the doctrine of absolute
liability as an acceptable theory to rely upon, this would not automatically
36 92 S. Ct. at 1903.
37 208 F.2d at 293.
38 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 1 6, comment a (1934).
39 Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 285, 286 (1965); see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
40Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 564 (1952); see Wildwood
Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 74 (1963).
41 United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949).
RECENT CASESWinter, 19731
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be outcome determinative. Congress has provided express exceptions
where the Government will not be liable, and a great deal of controversy
has involved the discretionary function exception of section 2680(a).4 1
It has been suggested that the discretionary function exception was
adopted primarily to prevent the judiciary from substituting its view for
that of the legislature, thus, fostering the policy of separation of powers.43
In the field of negligence the purpose of the exception is brought into play
because the danger exists that in weighing the factors to determine whether
conduct is negligent the court may substitute their views for that of the
legislature. 44 Notwithstanding this danger, Professor Peck submits that
because there is "no element of disapproval or condemnation" in the field
of absolute liability, applying this theory under the FTCA would not
conflict with the purpose of the discretionary function exception, and
therefore the exception is inapplicable. 45 His view was apparently adopted
by the dissent in Neims.46 Although it may be true that to allow a claimant
to proceed on the theory of strict liability would not conflict with the
primary purpose of the discretionary function exception, the fact still
remains that if the activity is considered discretionary the exception is
applicable, even if the discretion is abused. 47 However, neither the majority
nor the dissent in Nelms faced the crucial issue as to the scope of the
discretionary function exception. 48 The Supreme Court has chosen to leave
the extent of the discretionary function exception in a state of turmoil
rather than to judicially define it.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the discretionary function
exception derives no support from the legislative history of the FTCA.4 9 If
4228 U.S.C. 2680(a) (1970).
43 James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Discretionary Function Exception:
The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957).
Support for this view can be found in the legislative history; see Hearings on H.R.
5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
29 (1942); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2245,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942).
44 Peck, supra note 31, at 453.
45 Id.
4692 S. Ct. at 1907.
47 Hearings on H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 33 (1942).
48 The court in Dalehite stated that the discretionary function exception includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities. 346 U.S. 15 at 35. The court went
on to point out that all the decisions were made at the planning level rather than the
operational level and did not subject the Government to liability. Id. at 42. Although
the validity of the planning-operational test was in doubt after Dalehite, the Supreme
Court's affirmation, per curium, of Union Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir.), affirmed per curium, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), a case based entirely on the
planning vs. operational level dichotomy, indicates that this test has been accepted by
the Supreme Court. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized the test's
existence, the court has not clearly drawn distinctions between these two levels.
49 See Hearings on H.R. 6463, supra note 47.
[Vol. 6:1
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the order to conduct the mission in Nelms is deemed to have been made
at the planning level, any finding of Governmental liability would clearly
be contrary to the express provisions of the FTCA.
50 The Supreme Court's
unwillingness to decide this issue has further complicated the ability to
recover damages caused by sonic booms.
5
'
The Nelms decision can be interpreted as awarding the members
of the Air Force a license to conduct sonic booms and not have to
face the consequences if they possess the requisite "discretion." As
Mr. Justice Black stated in Rayonier:
5 2
When the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him
destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently
did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole
benefits from the services performed by Government employees.
53
In summary, although the legislative history of the FTCA lends great
support for the argument that the doctrine of absolute liability is an accept-
able theory to employ to seek recovery under the FTCA, the Supreme
Court has chosen to rely on the Dalehite decision and completely overlook
later Supreme Court interpretations. The legislative history of the FTCA
also indicates that the discretionary function exception must always be
confronted, regardless of the theory one proceeds under to seek recovery.
It appears that the only solution lies in legislative action in two
areas. Congress must first, clearly indicate that the Government shall be
liable under the FTCA if a private person would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act occurred, even if
liability in that state is based upon the doctrine of absolute liability.
Furthermore, the Government must assume liability for damages caused
by sonic booms produced by military aircraft, regardless of the official
who authorized the program, where a causal connection can be shown.
DANIEL WALLEN
5028 U.S.C. 2680(a) (1970).
51 The Military Claims Act makes provisions for the administrative settlement of
claims not exceeding $5,000. 10 U.S.C. 2733 (1970). Sonic boom damage claims may
be paid under this section. Air Force Manual 112-1, Ch. 7 § 1, providing in part
that, "the Military Claims Act is an act of grace." A claimant acquires no legal or
equitable rights merely because injuries or damages are cognizable under it. The
legislation confers no rights to judicial review if the Secretary of Defense refuses
a claim. If administrative relief is denied the Air Force is usually relieved of liability
under the discretionary function exception; see Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d
1264 (9th Cir. 1970); McMurray v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo.
1968); Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.C. 1965); Huslander v. United
States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. N.Y. 1964). See also Neher v. United States, 265
F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967), where the discretionary function exception was found
to be waived by stipulation.
52 352 U.S. 315.
53 Id. at 320.
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